Samuel Champlain, Part 3

On his third voyage in 1615, Samuel Champlain again came to the aid of his native allies against an Iroquois fort. Battle was joined on the 10th of October, in what is now Madison County, New York. Champlain ordered the construction of two siege engines for the assault. The first was a tower, taller than the walls of the fort, which was carried withing a “pike’s length” of the palisade and allowed the harquebusiers to shoot down from cover. The Japanese had used similar towers during their sieges in the Imjin War, but it seems that there the towers were placed outside of arrow range rather than close the walls. The second engine was a mantlet which would allow the attackers to set fire to the walls while protected from arrows, stones and water. Champlain’s allies, lacking the discipline to follow his orders or even those of their own captains, abandoned the mantlet as soon as the battle began, preferring to rain arrows uselessly into the fort. While Champlain had been constructing the siege engines, the Iroquois had reinforced their walls so that the harquebuzes could not pierce them.

The next day, at three o’clock in the afternoon, we arrived before the fort of their enemies, where the savages made some skirmishes with each other, although our design was not to disclose ourselves until the next day, which however the impatience of our savages would not permit, both on account of their desire to see fire opened upon their enemies, and also that they might rescue some of their own men who had become too closely engaged and were hotly pressed. Then I approached the enemy, and although I had only a few men, yet we showed them what they had never seen nor heard before; for, as soon as they saw us and heard the arquebus shots and the balls whizzing in their ears, they withdrew speedily to their fort, carrying the dead and wounded in this charge. We also withdrew to our main body, with five or six wounded, one of whom died.

This done, we withdrew to the distance of cannon range, out of sight of the enemy, but contrary to my advice and to what they had promised me. This moved me to address them very rough and angry words in order to incite them to do their duty, foreseeing that if everything should go according to their whim and the guidance of their council, their utter ruin would be the result. Nevertheless I did not fail to send to them and propose means which they should use in order to get possession of their enemies.

These were, to make with certain kinds of wood a cavalier* which should be higher than the palisades. Upon this were to be placed four or five of our arquebusiers, who should keep up a constant fire over their palisades and galleries, which were well provided with stones, and by this means dislodge the enemy who might attack us from their galleries. Meanwhile orders were to be given to procure boards for making a sort of mantelet** to protect our men from the arrows and stones of which the savages generally make use. These instruments, namely the cavalier and mantelets, were capable of being carried by a large number of men. One mantelet was so constructed that the water could not extinguish the fire, which might be set to the fort, under cover of the arquebusiers, who were doing their duty on the cavalier. In this manner, I told them, we might be able to defend ourselves so that the enemy could not approach to extinguish the fire which we should set to their ramparts.

This proposition they thought good and very seasonable, and immediately proceeded to carry it out as I directed. In fact the next day they set to work, some to cut wood, others to gather it, for building and equipping the cavalier and mantelets. The work was promptly executed and in less than four hours, although the amount of wood they had collected for burning against the ramparts, in order to set fire to them, was very small. Their expectation was that the five hundred men who had promised to come would do so on this day, but doubt was felt about them, since they had not appeared at the rendezvous, as they had been charged to do, and as they had promised. This greatly troubled our savages; but seeing that they were sufficiently numerous to take the fort without other assistance, and thinking for my part that delay, if not in all things at least in many, is prejudicial, I urged them to attack it, representing to them that the enemy, having become aware of their force and our arms, which pierced whatever was proof against arrows, had begun to barricade themselves and cover themselves with strong pieces of wood, with which they were well provided and their village filled. I told them that the least delay was the best, since the enemy had already strengthened themselves very much; for their village was enclosed by four good palisades, which were made of great pieces of wood, interlaced with each other, with an opening of not more than half a foot between two, and which were thirty feet high, with galleries after the manner of a parapet, which they had furnished with double pieces of wood that were proof against our arquebus shots. Moreover it was near a pond where the water was abundant, and was well supplied with gutters, placed between each pair of palisades, to throw out water, which they had also under cover inside, in order to extinguish fire. Now this is the character of their fortifications and defences, which are much stronger than the villages of the Attigouautan and others.
An_Iroquois_Fort

We approached to attack the village, our cavalier being carried by two hundred of the strongest men, who put it down before the village at a pike’s length off. I ordered three arquebusiers to mount upon it, who were well protected from the arrows and stones that could be shot or hurled at them. Meanwhile the enemy did not fail to send a large number of arrows which did not miss, and a great many stones, which they hurled from their palisades. Nevertheless a hot fire of arquebusiers forced them to dislodge and abandon their galleries, in consequence of the cavalier which uncovered them, they not venturing to show themselves, but fighting under shelter. Now when the cavalier was carried forward, instead of bringing up the mantelets according to order, including that one under cover of which we were to set the fire, they abandoned them and began to scream at their enemies, shooting arrows into the fort, which in my opinion did little harm to the enemy.

But we must excuse them, for they are not warriors, and besides will have no discipline nor correction, and will do only what they please. Accordingly one of them set fire inconsiderately to the wood placed against the fort of the enemy, quite the wrong was and in the face of the wind, so that it produced no effect.

This fire being out, the greater part of the savages began to carry wood against the palisades, but in so small quantity that the fire could have no great effect. Tehre also arose such disorder among them that one could not understand another, which greatly troubled me. In vain did I shout in their ears and remonstrate to my utmost with them as to the danger to which they exposed themselves by their bad behavior, but on account of the great noise they made they heard nothing. Seeing that shouting would only burst my head, and that my remonstrances were useless for putting a stop to the disorder, I did nothing more, but determined together with my men to do what we could, and fire upon such as we could see.

Meanwhile the enemy profited by our disorder to get water and pour it so abundantly that you would have said brooks were flowing through their spouts, the result of which was that the fire was instantly extinguished, while they did not cease shooting their arrows, which fell upon us like hail. But the men on the cavalier killed and maimed many. We were engaged in this combat about three hours, in which two of our chiefs and leading warriors were wounded, namely, one called Ochateguain and another Orani, together with some fifteen common warriors. The others, seeing their men and some of the chiefs wounded, now began to talk of a retreat without farther fighting, in expectation of the five hundred men, whose arrival could not be much delayed. Thus they retreated, a disorderly rabble.

Moreover the chiefs have in fact no absolute control over their men, who are governed by their own will and follow their own fancy, which is the cause of their disorder and the ruin of all their undertakings; for, having determined upon anything with their leaders, it needs only the whim of a villain, or nothing at all, to lead them to break it off and form a new plan. Thus there is no concert of action among them, as can be seen by this expedition.

Now we withdrew into our fort, I having received two arrow wounds, one in the leg, the other in the knee, which caused me great inconvenience, aside from the severe pain. When they were all assembled, I addressed them some words of remonstrance on the disorder that had occurred. But all I said availed nothing, and had no effect upon them. They replied that many of their men had been wounded, like myself, so that it would cause the others much trouble and inconvenience to carry them as they retreated, and that it was not possible to return again against their enemies, as I told them it was their duty to do….
We remained in camp until the 16th of the month, during which time there were some skirmishes between the enemy and our men, who were very often surrounded by the former, rather through their imprudence than from lack of courage; for I assure you that every time we went to the charge it was necessary for us to go and disengage them from the crowd, since they could only retreat under cover of our arquebusiers, whom the enemy greatly dreaded and feared; for as soon as they perceived any one of the arquebusiers they withdrew speedily, saying in a persuasive manner that we should not interfere in their combats, and that their enemies had very little courage to require us to assist them, with many other words of like tenor, in order to prevail upon us…

…They proceeded to make a kind of basket for carrying the wounded, who are put into it crowded up in a heap, being bound and pinioned in such a manner that it is as impossible for them to move as for an infant in its swaddling clothes; but this is not without causing the wounded much extreme pain. This I can say with truth from my own experience, having been carried some days, since I could not stand up, particularly on account of an arrow-wound which I had received in the knee. I never found myself such a gehenna as during this time, for the pain which I suffered in consequence of the wound in my knee was nothing in comparison with that which I endured while I was carried bound and pinioned on the back of one of our savages; so that I lost my patience, and as soon as I could sustain myself, go t out of this prison, or rather gehenna.

Samuel Champlain, Part 2

Again Champlain came to the aid of the Montagnai (Innu) and Algonquin against the Iroquois. This battle is larger than the one from my first post, and this time the Iroquois barricaded themselves in a fortress.

On the following day, we all set out together, and continued our route until the morning of the next day, the 19th of the month [of June, 1610], when we arrived at an island off the river of the Iroquois, and waited for the Algonquins, who were to be there the same day. While the Montagnais were felling trees to clear a place for dancing, and for arranging themselves for the arrival of the Algonquins, an Algonquin canoe was suddenly seen coming in haste, to bring word that the Algonquins had fallen in with a hundred Iroquois, who were strongly barricaded, and that it would be difficult to conquer them, unless they should come speedily, together with the Matigoches, as they call us.

The alarm at once sounded among them, and each one got into his canoe with his arms. They were quickly in readiness, but with confusion ; for they were so precipitate that, instead of making haste, they hindered one another. They came to our barque and the other, begging me, together with my companions, to go with them in their canoes, and they were so urgent that I embarked with four others. I requested our pilot, La Routte, to stay in the barque, and send me some four or five more of my companions, if the other barques would send some shallops with men to aid us ; for none of the barques were inclined to go with the savages, except Captain Thibaut, who, having a barque there, went with me. The savages cried out to those who remained, saying that they were woman-hearted, and that all they could do was to make war upon their peltry.

Meanwhile, after going some half a league, all the savages crossing the river landed, and, leaving their canoes, took their bucklers, bows, arrows, clubs, and swords, which they attach to the end of large sticks, and proceeded to make their way in the woods, so fast that we soon lost sight of them, they leaving us, five in number, without guides. This displeased us ; but, keeping their tracks constantly in sight, we followed them, although we were often deceived. We went through dense woods, and over swamps and marshes, with the water always up to our knees, greatly encumbered by a pike-man’s corselet, with which each one was armed. We were also tormented in a grievous and unheard-of manner by quantities of mosquitoes, which were so thick that they scarcely permitted us to draw breath.

After going about half a league under these circumstances, and no longer knowing where we were, we perceived two savages passing through the woods, to whom we called and told them to stay with us, and guide us to the whereabouts of the Iroquois, otherwise we could not go there, and should get lost in the woods. They stayed to guide us. After proceeding a short distance, we saw a savage coming in haste to us, to induce us to advance as rapidly as possible, giving me to understand that the Algonquins and Montagnais had tried to force the barricade of the Iroquois but had been repulsed, that some of the best men of the Montagnais had been killed in the attempt, and several wounded, and that they had retired to wait for us, in whom was their only hope. We had not gone an eighth of a league with this savage, who was an Algonquin captain, before we heard the yells and cries on both sides, as they jeered at each other, and were skirmishing slightly while awaiting us.

As soon as the savages perceived us, they began to shout, so that one could not have heard it thunder. I gave orders to my companions to follow me steadily, and not to leave me on any account. I approached the barricade of the enemy, in order to reconnoitre it. It was constructed of large trees placed one upon another, and of a circular shape, the usual form of their fortifications. All the Montagnais and Algonquins approached likewise the barricade. Then we commenced firing numerous musket-shots through the brush-wood, since we could not see them, as they could us.

Fort des Yroquois
The translator notes: “If Champlain’s drawing may be trusted, the Indians fired high in air, that their arrows might come down upon the heads of their enemies. The stockade was of course roofless.”

I was wounded while firing my first shot at the side of their barricade by an arrow, which pierced the end of my ear and entered my neck. I seized the arrow, and tore it from my neck. The end of it was armed with a very sharp stone. One of my companions also was wounded at the same time in the arm by an arrow, which I tore out for him. Yet my wound did not prevent me from doing my duty : our savages also, on their part, as well as the enemy, did their duty, so that you could see the arrows fly on all sides as thick as hail.

The Iroquois were astonished at the noise of our muskets, and especially that the balls penetrated better than their arrows. They were so frightened at the effect produced that, seeing several of their companions fall wounded and dead, they threw themselves on the ground whenever they heard a discharge, supposing that the shots were sure. We scarcely ever missed firing two or three balls at one shot, resting our muskets most of the time on the side of their barricade. But, seeing that our ammunition began to fail, I said to all the savages that it was necessary to break down their barricades and capture them by storm ; and that, in order to accomplish this, they must take their shields, cover themselves with them, and thus approach so near as to be able to fasten stout ropes to the posts that supported the barricades, and pull them down by main strength, in that way making an opening large enough to permit them to enter the fort.

I told them that we would meanwhile, by our musketry-fire, keep off the enemy, as they endeavored to prevent them from accomplishing this; also that a number of them should get behind some large trees, which were near the barricade, in order to throw them down upon the enemy, and that others should protect these with their shields, in order to keep the enemy from injuring them. All this they did very promptly. And, as they were about finishing the work, the barques, distant a league and a half, hearing the reports of our muskets, knew that we were engaged in conflict; and a young man from St. Malo, full of courage, Des Prairies by name, who like the rest had come with his barque to engage in peltry traffic, said to his companions that it was a great shame to let me fight in this way with the savages without coming to my assistance ; that for his part he had too high a sense of honor to permit him to do so, and that he did not wish to expose himself to this reproach. Accordingly, he determined to come to me in a shallop with some of his companions, together with some of mine whom he took with him. Immediately upon his arrival, he went towards the fort of the Iroquois, situated on the bank of the river. Here he landed, and came to find me.

Upon seeing him, I ordered our savages who were breaking down the fortress to stop, so that the new-comers might have their share of the sport. I requested Sieur des Prairies and his companions to fire some salvos of musketry, before our savages should carry by storm the enemy, as they had decided to do. This they did, each one firing several shots, in which all did their duty well.

After they had fired enough, I addressed myself to our savages, urging them to finish the work. Straightway, they approached the barricade, as they had previously done, while we on the flank were to fire at those who should endeavor to keep them from breaking it down. They behaved so well and bravely that, with the help of our muskets, they made an opening, which, however, was difficult to go through, as there was still left a portion as high as a man, there being also branches of trees there which had been beaten down, forming a serious obstacle. But, when I saw that the entrance was quite practicable, I gave orders not to fire any more, which they obeyed. At the same instant, some twenty or thirty, both of savages and of our own men, entered, sword in hand, without finding much resistance.

Immediately, all who were unharmed took to flight. But they did not proceed far; for they were brought down by those around the barricade, and those who escaped were drowned in the river. We captured some fifteen prisoners, the rest being killed by musket-shots, arrows, and the sword. When the fight was over, there came another shallop, containing some of my companions. This, although behind time, was yet in season for the booty, which, however, was not of much account. There were only robes of beaver-skin, and dead bodies covered with blood, which the savages would not take the trouble to plunder, laughing at those in the last shallop, who did so ; for the others did not engage in such low business. This, then, is the victory obtained by God’s grace, for gaining which they gave us much praise.

The savages scalped the dead, and took the heads as a trophy of victory, according to their custom. They returned with fifty wounded Montagnais and Algonquins and three dead, singing and leading their prisoners with them. They attached to sticks in the prows of their canoes the heads and a dead body cut into quarters, to eat in revenge, as they said. In this way they went to our barques off the River of the Iroquois.

We see similar themes to the other early New World battles. A few musketeers are able to hold their own against a great number of archers. The musketeers multiply their firepower by loading extra bullets. The lethality of the archers is low. Even though an arrow wound through the neck sounds very serious, it did not even put Champlain hors de combat. The muskets, on the other hand, were powerful enough to blast right through the wooden walls of the barricade.

The Indians however were cunning, and successfully adapted to resist Champlain’s muskets, as we will see in the next post.

Martino Martini – Bellum Tartaricum, 1654

Unlike Polofox, who I posted earlier, the Italian missionary Martino Martini, the author of this history of the Manchu conquest, had actually been to China. He has little to say on the types of arms used, only this:


Pages 16-18

But the City [Leaotung] was defended by exceeding many men, who generally were all armed with musquets: the Tartars had nothing by their Scymetars, with Bows and Arrows, which they discharged with strange dexterity & Art. But because they chiefly feared the musquet bullets, they resolved by a Stratagem to make that unknown Instrument less hurtfull to them than their Enemies did imagin. For the Tartarian King commanded such as made the first onset, to carry a thick hard board for their Shield, which was as good to them as a wooden Wall; these men were seconded by other Companies who carried Ladders to climb up the Walls; an the Horse came up in the Rear. In this manner he set upon the City in four quarters, and received the discharge of their Musquets against his Wooden wall; Then in a moment the scaling ladders being applied, before they could charge again, they were upon the Walls and enterd the City; for such is the quickness and nimbleness of the Tartars (in which they excel all Nations, and idn which also they place their chief art) that in a trice, they either prevail in their Designs, or retire: and the little skill the Chineses had in the use of Musquets, was no small hinderance to this War. For the Tartars quickness and nimblenes not giving them time to charge again being astonished with the suddain inundation of armed men, they presently fled which way soever they could…


The Ming seem to have had a shortage of bullets or cannon balls, at least in Beijing. In 1644 Beijing, the Ming capital, was besieged and captured by Li Zicheng’s rebel army. Shortly after crowning himself Emperor, Li fled the city to escape the invading Manchu army. This is the second reference I have seen to cannons being fired empty:


Page 85

But, however it was, these Pilferers came in a short time to besiege the Royal City of Peking. There was in that City a vast Garrison, and as great a quantity of Artillery; but on the Quarters upon which the enemy made there assault, there was none charged with Bullets, but only with Powder.


The second comes from the scholar-bureaucrat Liu Shangyou, who had arrived in Beijing just a few months before the siege:


Lynn A. Struve, Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm. Yale University Press, 2003. 11-12

On the 17th [of the 3rd month, April 23] artillery fire shook the heavens, and I knew the bandits had reached the foot of the city walls. The guns on the walls were fired empty as often as not– for lack of ammunition. Below the walls the bandits also relied on artillery for their attack; each firing of a cannon was sure to collapse a roof or topple some tiles– anything that got in the way was smashed. Their ammunition was shaped like a man’s thumb– keen and shiny, hard and slick, really effective.


Robert Barret – The Theorike and Practike of Moderne VVarres, 1598

Barret is another military writer critical of “inueterate conceirers of bowes and blacke billes”. Barret asserts the superiority of the firearm over the bow, the corselet over the jack, and the pike over the bill (halberd). I have skipped over the sections dealing with the bill and jack.
Pages 2-3
Gent.

You haue touched many pointes vnder a few termes, but (Captaine) all this and much more will hardly perswade our rurall sort; and I thinke many of vs Gentlemen not farre better minded: for in executing her Maiesties commands, for trayning our men, prouiding of armour, I heare many say, what neede so much a do, and great charge in Calliuer, Musket, Pyke and Corselet? our auncestors won many battels with bowes, blacke Billes, and Iackes. But what thinke you of that?

Captaine.

Sir, then was then, and now is now; the wars are much altered since the fierie weapons first came vp: the Cannon, the Musket, the Caliuer and Pistoll. Although some haue attempted stifly to maintaine the sufficiencie of Bowes, yet daily experience doth and will shew vs the contrarie. And for that their reasons haue bene answered by others, I leaue at this instant to speake thereof.

Gent.

Why, do you not like of our old archerie of England?

Capt.

I do not altogether disalow them; true it is, they may serue to some sorts of seruice, but to no such effect as any of the fierie weapons.

Gent.

Will not a thousand bowes handled by good bowmen, do as good seruice, as a thousand hargubuze or muskets, especially amongst horsemen?

Capt.

No, were there such bowmen as were in the old time, yet could there be no comparison.

Gent.

Your reasons.

Capt.

First, you must confesse that one of your best Archers can hardly shoot any good sheffe arrow aboue twelue score off, to performe any great execution, except vpon a naked man, or horse. A good Calliuer charged with good powder and bullet, and discharged at point blanck by any reasonable shot, will, at that distance, performe afar better execution, yea, to passe any armour, except it be of prooffe, & much more neare the marke then your Archer shal: And the said Calliuer at randon will reach & performe twentie, or foure and twentie score off, whereunto you haue few archers will come neare. And if you reply, that a good archer will shoot many shots to one; Truly no, your archer shall hardly get one in fiue of a ready shot, nay happely scarce one; besides, considering the execution of the one and the other, there is great oddes, and no comparison at all.

Gent.

But our bowmen may shoot by vollies, as thicke as hayle in the ayre.

Capt.

They may shoot thicke, but to small performance, except (as I said) vpon naked men or horse. But should there be led but eight hundred perfect hargubu∣ziers, or sixe hundred good musketiers against your thousand bowmen, I thinke your bowmen would be forced to forsake their ground, all premisses considered: and moreouer a vollie of musket or hargubuze goeth with more terrour, fury, and execution, then doth your vollie of arrowes. And againe, against a resolute troupe of horse, either Pistoletiers, Hargulatiers or Lanciers, they will stand lesse time (except they be well fronted with hedge, ditch or trench; or seconded with a strong stand of pikes,) then either Hargubuze or Musket, considering the execution of the one & the other. And what souldier is he, that commeth against a weapon wherein there is little hazard of life, which will not more resolutely charge, then against a weapon, whose execution he knoweth to be present death? Many more reasons might be alledged for the sufficiencie of the one, and the insufficiencie of the other, but others haue answered the same already, besides the proofe which dayly experience bringeth: and thus you heare mine opinion of your Bowes; desiring you (Gentlemen and others) not to conceiue sinisterly of me for this mine opinion, as not held of me for any dislike I haue of our old Archery of England: but that common experience hath made it most manifest in these our later warres: well wishing in my hart (had it bene Gods good will) that this infernall fierie engine had neuer bin found out. Then might we boldly haue compared (as our auncestors did) with the proudest Archers in the world.

But you must note this by the way, that the fierie shot, either on horsebacke, or foote, being not in hands of the skilfull, may do vnto themselues more hurt then good: wherefore the same is often to be practised, that men may grow perfect and skilfull therein.

Pages 4-5
Gent.

Your proportion I like well, but our countrey people are loth to be at the charges of so many costly weapons, although her Maiestie and her honorable priuie Counsell, haue giuen orders and directions for the same.

Capt.

I perceiue it to be so, whereat I grieue not a litle, considering, how dangerous is the time; how malicious, strong, & politike is the enimie; how carelesse, yea senslesse are we; and how vnwilling to our owne weale? But should these your secure men once heare the Alarme of the enemie, (from the which God defend vs,) then should you soone see them alter their copies, chaunge their colours, forget their great bragges of blacke Bills and Bowes, and stand at their wittes ende what course to take; and should they yet recall their courage, and plucke vp their spirites, and dare to looke the enimie in the face, what guides (I pray) haue they? It is not enough to say downe with them, downe with them, Lay on Billes and Bowes: they should encounter strong squares of armed Pikes, gallant squadrons of Muskets, braue troupes of shot, conducted by skilfull Leaders: then should they soone see the difference of weapons; the danger of the one, the litle doubt of the other, with repentance (perhaps) for not taking them to other weapons in time. Thus much I speak to our inueterate conceirers of bowes and blacke billes.

William Garrard – The Arte of VVarre

The Arte of VVarre, by William Garrad, d. 1587, published posthumously 1591.

Page 2-3:

He which seekes to attaine and attribute to himselfe the honourable name of a Souldier, must first employ his time in practice of those armes wherewith he means to serue, and so apply his time, that when any enterprise shall call him forth to make proofe thereof, he may be able to handle his peece with due dexterity, and his pike with assured agilitie : since those be the weapons wherwith now Mars doth most commonly arme his warlike troupe, and trie each doubtfull fight of bloudy battaile : for in this our age experience and practise makes apparant that Archers amongst forreine Nations be neuer vsed, and the halberd but either amongst few or few in number. The Archer serues to small purpose, but when he is shadowed with some trench or bulwarke free from hargabuse or musket-shot : Or that lyning a band of Hargabusiers, hee doth second them in any inuading onset, and then a whole flight of arrowes, so that they be light and able to flie aboue tweluescore, will maruellously gaule any maine battell of footemen or Squadron of Horsemen. The Halberd likewise doth onely serue in the sacke of a towne, in a breach, in a sally, or canuisado, to enter a house, or in the throng of a stroken battell to execute slaughter ; wherefore touching these two weapons, vnlesse necessitie constraine, and that Hargabusiers be wanting, Archers may well be spared : and these great numbers of Halberdiers and Bill-men, which are and haue beene in times past vsed in England, may well be left off, saue a few to guard euery Ensigne, and to attend vpon the Colonell, or Captaine, which in an armie will amount to a sufficient number to depresse the ouercome and flying enemy.

Page 82

Caliuers or Hargabuzieres, or Musketieres
Such must haue either of them a good and sufficient peece, flask, tutch-bore, pouder, shot, yron, mold, worme, tyrebale, rammer, swoord and dagger, and a morion. The like must the Musketeare haue, witha  forked staffe best hye, with a stringe to fasten to his wrist. Such as serue with shot in raine, mistes and windes, must haue their peeces chardged and primed: They must carie the tutch hoale of their peeces under their arme-hoales, match light in their hands couertly and drie, their peeces faire and cleane within and without, so bee they seruicable at all times, hauing regard they keepe their march and retyre of good distance in sunder, their match and pouder verie drie, and their peeces often chardged and discharged.

Archers or long Bowes.
Necessarie it is that euery man haue a good and meete bowe, according to his draught and strength, light & easie, a light side jake hanging loose to his knee, with a skul, swoord & dagger, nothing upon his armes, wherby in time of seruice hee may easilie draw the arrow to the head, that they may deliuer the same with strength and art, as Englishmen bee accustomed, They must haue also a bracer and shooting gloue, their stringes whipped and waxed ouer with glew, their feathers drie: and so is he seruiceable.

Page 112-113

These two bands of Hargabuzers set to encounter the enemy on their broad sides, the fronts discharge & turn their faces, retyring betwixt the other, which aduance in like maner for their rescue. These retire and charge againe to seruice, by practicing the skirmish in this sort, you may bring bands of Archers to seruice, to the great anoying & discomfiting of the enemie.

These bands of Archers beeing brought to seruice by the Hargabuziers, although the hargabuziers bee accompted to be of greater force then they bee of, and the Archers not now so much used in the field as they haue bin, yet hauing light shaftes made to shot 12. or 14. scoore, may keepe their place, shooting al together ouer the heads of the hargabuziers, to the gauling, blemishing, and great annoy of the enemie.

Jacopo di Porcia: The Preceptes of Warre

A military manual by Jacopo di Porcia. Some of the advise is obvious, some silly. This is a text transcription from EEBO and I’m not confident at all that it’s accurately transcribed. Translated 1544 by Peter Betham.

32. ¶ Of gonners on horsebacke.
It shal not be vnprofitable to acquaynten and wount your horses, as the duchmen do, to suffer the sytter whyche is a gunner and not to be affrayed therof. For no sorte of souldyers, is more profytable than they nor yet doth more myschife and hurte. For no man is so well harnaysed, that can be saulfe from them: such a vyolence is in that warlye instrumente.
33. ¶ Of gunnes called serpentines wyth other.
It shall be very profitable to haue many wagons & charettes laden with gons For there is none armye so strong, whom they wyll not destroye, so that horses & men far of be slayne, wyth them. Also the great sounde shal so feare men, that their strength and courage shal fal and decay.

42. ¶ Of bowes.
Fotemen with bowes, whych englysh men vse: do greate seruyce in an host. For there is no breste plate, whyche is able to wythstand, and holde owte the stroke of the arrowes, suche force and vyolence is in bowes.

87. ¶ What is to be done when we mistrust our souldyours to be afrayed of the sowne of gunnes and noyse of them yt wayle.
Yf any lykenesse be, or mistrust that thy souldyours bene afrayed of the gunshote and otherwyse, whereby theyr hertes be lyke to fayle, it is a good pollicye, to stop their eares with some thing, and so with out feare they shall fyght, neyther hea∣ryng the wofull waylynges of them that be wounded, ne yet the noyse of gunnes. Whych pollicye wyl serue at these dayes agaynst the Almaynes that vse a greate nombre of gunnes in theyr armyes.

88. ¶ What is to be done when thyne enemyes be moost parte archers.
When our enemyes be for the mooste part archers, then set aganyst them, men fenced with tergates, whych sort of souldyours be sometyme in the hostes of the East partie. And by this pollicie thyne army shal be out of theyr daunger.

92 ¶ A pollicie to diffeate and dispoynt the gunners, that they stande in no stede and vse.
The Frenchemen and Almaynes, at these dayes haue in thēyr armies a great nombre of gunners, which sore trouble & hyndre theyr enemies. Wherfore my counsayle is, that armye (which hath no suche souldyours) to sette vpon them in mooste raynye wether. For at those tymes they be vnseruyable, and can do no good.